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Unemployment Compensation 
and Older Workers
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W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Stephen A. Wandner 
U.S. Department of Labor
Unemployment compensation in the United States is provided 
through a federal-state system of unemployment insurance (UI). UI 
provides temporary partial wage replacement to active job seekers who 
are involuntarily out of work. Eligibility for UI benefits and compen 
sation levels depend on recent earnings experience, the conditions of 
job separation, and continuing job search activity. The amount of com 
pensation paid for any week of joblessness can be affected by current 
income from other sources, including part-time work and pensions.
During the second half of the working life, decisions about the pro 
cess and timing of movement toward full retirement move to the fore 
front. For many, the sequence is voluntary and orderly; for others, job 
displacement greatly disrupts plans. While UI is critical for income 
security of the latter group, it may also play an important role for the 
former.
Most economic analysis of retirement patterns has focused on the 
financial incentives created by public and private pension systems. 1 
Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990, p. 5) pointed out that while an 
abrupt and complete transition from full-time work is still the most 
common avenue to retirement, a variety of others paths are often taken. 
A crucial concept in their research is that of the career job. The career 
job is the one in which a worker spends the bulk of his or her working 
life, usually working full time. If transition from the career job to 
retirement is not immediate, it may involve an hours reduction to part- 
time work on the career job. Alternatively, there may be an exit from 
the career job to full- or part-time work on another job, which most 
often is not in the same industry and occupation.
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Bridge employment is what Quinn (1999) calls work between the 
career job and complete retirement. He estimates that a minimum of 
49 percent of women and 34 percent of men engage in bridge employ 
ment and that the great majority of bridge employment involves fewer 
hours per week and less compensation per hour than the career job. 
The probability of involuntary exit from the career job later in life is 
high and has risen in recent years (Farber 1997). Furthermore, the 
chance of gaining reemployment after displacement from a career job 
diminishes with age (Chan and Stevens 1999).
Job and income security after age 45 and strategies for transition to 
retirement can be greatly influenced by the institutional arrangements 
of UI. Many issues at the forefront of the current UI policy debate are 
also issues of prime importance to those in the second half of their 
working life. Issues occur in all the standard areas of UI policy: cover 
age, eligibility, benefit adequacy, duration of benefits, work incentives, 
benefit financing, and interaction with other programs. We will exam 
ine issues of prime concern to older workers in these areas of UI policy 
after providing a brief background sketch of the labor market situation 
of older workers.
BACKGROUND
Whether they can admit it to themselves or not, the second half of 
their working life starts by age 45 for the great majority of Americans. 
In this chapter, we examine the labor market and UI beneficiary experi 
ence of those aged 45 and over relative to those who are younger. The 
investigation is summary in nature and is meant to suggest topic areas 
where focused research would be valuable. We rely on published sum 
mary statistics reported in the Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics 
(Jacobs 1999), the Social Security Administration's publication Income 
of the Population 55 or Older—1996 (Social Security Administration 
1998), on samples drawn for evaluation and modeling in the states of 
Michigan and Washington, and on unpublished data provided by the 
U.S. Department of Labor based on their Benefit Accuracy Measure 
ment (BAM) system of random audits. 2
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The percentages of older workers among the labor force, the total 
unemployed, and the insured unemployed are reported in Table 1 for 
the United States in 1998; the data are based on monthly averages for 
the year. The table indicates that those aged 45 years and over made up 
one-third of the labor force, encompassed only one-fifth of those expe 
riencing unemployment, but included one-third of all UI beneficiaries. 
Table 2 provides an age distribution of insured unemployment by state 
for 1998. Note that the retirement states Arizona and Florida reason 
ably mimic the national shares of UI receipt by age, whereas the Dis 
trict of Columbia pays a disproportionately large share to older 
workers, and payments are weighted heavily toward younger workers 
in Maryland, Oregon, and Puerto Rico. The national average numbers 
suggest that older workers shoulder a proportionately small share of 
the unemployment burden while enjoying a higher-than-average 
chance of receiving UI compensation while jobless and seeking work.
These summary statistics on UI recipiency for older workers are at 
odds with trends experienced by the work force as a whole since the 
state UI reforms following the 1975 and 1982 recessions. Vroman 
(1991) summarized research into causes of the decline in the ratio of 
the insured unemployment rate to the total unemployment rate (IUR/ 
TUR). Burtless (1983) identified a raft of factors including tightened 
eligibility requirements, a rising level of UI exhaustions, and the intro 
duction of income taxes on UI benefits. This last factor operates 
because those from higher-income households are less likely to apply 
for benefits. Blank and Card (1991) found the decline partly explained 
by tightened eligibility, but largely due to a decline in UI benefit appli 
cation rates. They estimated the overall take-up rate among those eligi 
ble for UI benefits to be only about 65 percent. Corson and Nicholson 
(1988) identified declines in unionism and manufacturing employment 
as causes of a declining IUR/TUR ratio. Concerning older workers, 
Corson and Nicholson (1988) suggested that changed treatment of the 
pension benefit offset required by the federal unemployment compen 
sation amendments of 1976 may explain part of the declining IUR/ 
TUR. Details about the treatment of pensions in UI are provided 
below.
One factor that could partly explain higher recipiency rates among 
older unemployed workers is that a large share of older UI claimants 
may be dislocated workers. In employment policy and research defini-
Table 1 Labor Force and Unemployment Concepts by Age for the United States, 1998
Labor force3 (000)
% of labor force
Total unemployed13 (000)
% of total unemployed








































1 Data from Jacobs (1999, Table 1-6).
b Data from Jacobs (1999, Table 1-26).
c Unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Labor, UI Service. Age information not available for 1.8 percent of beneficiaries.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Unpublished U S Department of Labor data on claims filed for UI in the week including 12th of each month. 
a INA = age information not available for this percentage of UI beneficiaries.
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tions, dislocated workers are those with long job tenure who become 
permanently separated from their employer. 3 Being dislocated 
increases workers' chances of eligibility for UI benefits. Unfortu 
nately, such circumstances may increase the probability of UI benefit 
exhaustion. Relying on data from Hippie (1999a), Table 3 shows that 
job dislocation increases with age; Farber (1997) found similar evi 
dence.4 Table 3 also shows that employment rates decline precipitously 
after age 54 and that the prospect of returning to full-time reemploy- 
ment after displacement is 30-70 percent lower for older workers. 
Less than one-tenth of displaced workers under 55 years of age leave 
the labor force, but more than one-fourth of workers aged 55 to 64 and 
nearly half of those 65 and over exit. Chan and Stevens (1999) simi 
larly found that involuntary job loss reduces reemployment chances 
more for older job seekers, who often make early transitions to being 
permanently out of the labor force (i.e., fully retired).
Unpublished data from the displaced worker survey (Hippie 
1999b) revealed that while only 51 percent of all displaced workers 
received UI, the percentage rises as durations of unemployment 
increase. Three-quarters of displaced workers unemployed for five or 
more weeks received UI, and, among those unemployed for 15 or more 
weeks, the proportion rises to four-fifths. Thus, it appears that some 
displaced workers never file for UI benefits, as they search for jobs and 
become reemployed quickly; only one-fifth of displaced workers 
unemployed for less than five weeks collect benefits. These data also 
indicate that while the rate of recipiency of UI is stable among age 
groups around the mean of 51 percent, exhaustion rates rise sharply 
with age.
The path of employment and income transition from a career job to 
retirement income can be rocky. As shown in Table 3, displaced work 
ers become reemployed at rapidly declining rates as they age. Older 
displaced workers who gain reemployment also suffer larger earnings 
losses. Among displaced workers aged 55 to 64, the earnings loss was 
20 percent or more for 38.2 percent of those who got reemployed, 
while an earnings reduction of that magnitude was experienced by less 
than a quarter of younger displaced workers.
For those who do ultimately receive UI benefits, the Benefits Accu 
racy Measurement (BAM) audit data provides a picture of their charac 
teristics. 5 Such a summary is provided in Table 4. Men tend to draw a
Table 3 Long-Tenured Displaced Workers by Age Group, 1995-1996 (%)
Characteristics
Displacement rates
Employment status, February 1998
Employed
Unemployed
Not in labor force
Among displaced
Reemployed full-time
Of those reemployed full time, %























































SOURCE: First six rows, Hippie (1999a); last two rows, Hippie (1999b). 
a Percentage not reported where the base is less than 75,000. 
b Values for age 55 and over.








Some high school, no diploma
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SOURCE: BAM data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of Labor.
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larger share of UI benefits up until age 65. Older beneficiaries tend to 
have lower levels of formal educational attainment. Beneficiaries over 
age 54 are less likely to be Black or Hispanic and more likely to be 
White1 or Asian/Pacific islander. The age distribution of the prior occu 
pation is different for the oldest workers. After age 64, larger shares of 
beneficiaries are from sales and services occupations and smaller 
shares are from structural occupations. These results are consistent 
with a movement into bridge occupations prior to full retirement.
COVERAGE
"The coverage provisions of state UI laws determine the employers 
who are liable for contributions and the workers who accrue rights 
under the laws" (U.S. Department of Labor 1999, p. 1-D). Original 
federal requirements limited coverage to employers of 8 or more work 
ers in each of 20 or more weeks in a year (Blaustein 1993, p. 162). UI 
coverage today is nearly universal, with only four main exclusions 
remaining: agricultural workers, household workers, employees of reli 
gious organizations, and the self-employed (Bassi and McMurrer 1997, 
pp. 54-61)
Exclusion of the self-employed is an issue of particular importance 
to older workers. Table 5 indicates that 6.8 percent of all nonagricul- 
tural workers participate in self-employment, but the share rises to 10.9 
percent of those aged 55 to 64 and to 17.2 percent of those aged 65 and 
over. It is even more important among workers in agriculture, for 
whom a majority of those 45 years of age and over are self-employed.
Since the depression-era beginnings of the federal-state UI pro 
gram in the United States, the self-employed have generally not been 
covered. The main reason is to avoid problems of moral hazard.6 With 
UI for self-employment, those who would pay premiums and be eligi 
ble for benefits would also manage the risk of unemployment and make 
decisions about work stoppage. In particular, there is an inability to 
determine whether individuals are involuntarily unemployed, to mea 
sure the economic loss of income, and to determine whether an individ 
ual is employed or unemployed for a given week. UI is social



















































































































































SOURCE: Employment and Earnings 46(1), January 1999, Table 15.
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insurance and extending coverage to the self-employed compromises 
the insurance nature of the program.
California is the only state that has a limited form of UI coverage 
for the self-employed. The California scheme operates on a fully reim 
bursable basis. This method of coverage has been used widely in the 
UI program first for governmental agencies and since 1972 for private 
nonprofit firms. In 1998, reimbursable benefits accounted for 5.7 per 
cent of all payments in the federal-state system, with 42 percent of 
these reimbursables going to employees separated from nonprofits 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1998). Reimbursement may not be a par 
ticularly effective approach to UI coverage, but it is a method of avoid 
ing the moral hazard issue by not allowing manipulation of the system 
for one's own benefit (Bassi and McMurrer 1997). Under the reim 
bursable approach, repayment is due in the calendar quarter following 
disbursement of benefits. Such a system would amount to short-term 
loans to self-employed for reintegration back to regular wage and sal 
ary employment. Feldstein and Altman (1998) suggested individual UI 
savings accounts that could be established with pre-tax contributions 
and might be particularly appropriate for the self-employed.7
While the UI system is not currently structured to provide tempo 
rary income replacement to the self-employed, in several states UI ben 
eficiaries can start their own business instead of searching for wage and 
salary employment. 8 While they establish their self-employment activ 
ity they can receive self-employment assistance (SEA) payments in 
lieu of UI weekly benefits. To date, 11 states have enacted conforming 
state legislation.9
The SEA program, like similar programs in nearly 20 other OECD 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) nations, 
has been very small. 10 In 1996, no state had as many as 0.5 percent of 
its regular UI recipients receiving SEA payments. SEA participants 
are generally successful at starting up their own business; about two- 
thirds do so. These participants differ dramatically from other UI 
claimants: they are older; less likely to be a minority (particularly His 
panic); more likely to be from professional, managerial and technical 
occupations; have higher educational attainment; and are more likely to 
be dislocated workers (Vroman 1999).
When the U.S. Department of Labor began the SEA experiments in 
Massachusetts and Washington in the 1980s, the overrepresentation of
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older workers was not expected. Participating states imagined that the 
program would be particularly valuable for minorities and women. It 
did not turn out that way either in the experiments or the early program 
operations." Rather, older permanently separated workers have found 
SEA to be a promising alternative, apparently because of their greater 
difficulty in finding wage and salary employment and because of skills 
acquired through years of employment.
ELIGIBILITY—INITIAL AND CONTINUING
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, eligibility for UI bene 
fits depends on recent earnings experience, the conditions of job sepa 
ration, and continuing job search activity. Rules regarding recent 
earnings activity call for checking for sufficient prior labor force 
attachment in Ul-covered work. 12 Essentially these rules ensure that 
UI premiums have been paid before compensation is granted. Earnings 
are considered for a base period consisting of four calendar quarters, 
which are usually the first four of the previous five completed quarters 
for administrative practicality. 13 Table 1 showed that workers aged 45 
and over make up only one-fifth of the unemployed, but they total more 
than one-third of all the UI beneficiaries. This suggests that a high pro 
portion of unemployed older workers had sufficient prior earnings to 
qualify for UI benefits.
The conditions of job separation were set to minimize insurance 
problems of moral hazard by essentially ensuring that the separation 
was involuntary and primarily due to lack of work, not due to controlla 
ble factors such as a quit, a collective bargaining dispute, or discharge 
for misconduct. Joblessness is compensable in all states for voluntary 
separations for good cause, which may include 1) sexual harassment, 
2) illness, 3) leaving to accept other work, 4) joining the armed forces, 
or 5) compulsory retirement (Nicholson 1997, p. 103). The last of 
these is of interest to older workers. As Quinn (1999) pointed out, 
mandatory retirement was outlawed entirely in 1986. Workers dis 
missed for reason of age have been illegally discharged and are there 
fore entitled to UI benefits, with the separating employer liable for 
benefit charges.
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The final requirements for jobless benefits are known as continuing 
eligibility conditions. These are set to ensure continuing labor force 
attachment. They are of two types: job search requirements and limits 
on refusing suitable work. The job search rules are known as "able, 
available, and actively seeking work" requirements. Administration of 
these rules is more art than science. 14
Job search requirements are not imposed on beneficiaries who are 
still waiting to be recalled by the employer liable for benefit charges. 
One of the original aims of UI was to prevent the dispersal of the expe 
rienced workers for an enterprise. Employers may temporarily fur 
lough workers and promise the employment security agency that the 
workers will be recalled to their old jobs. Using the BAM data, Table 6 
summarizes the recall status of UI beneficiaries by age, as well as the 
age distribution of various work search requirements. Workers aged 45 
and over are more likely to be on recall status during their period of UI 
benefit receipt, and the proportion awaiting recall appears to increase 
with age. Direct data on work search requirements suggest that the rate 
of job attachment among UI beneficiaries increases with age, and, as a 
result, there is a slight downward trend with age in required work 
search.
The UI system was designed to operate for full-time, permanently 
attached members of the labor force. Both initial and continuing UI 
benefit eligibility issues are raised when part-time employment is con 
sidered. As seen in Table 7, relative to those aged 25 to 54, part-time 
work is popular among both younger and older workers. For those 
aged 55 and over, more than one-quarter of all workers were employed 
part-time in 1998. Furthermore, over 30 percent of unemployed job 
seekers aged 55 and over were seeking part-time employment.
We now consider two questions concerning part-time work and ini 
tial UI eligibility, and then two different questions about part-time 
work and continuing eligibility.
A) If a part-time job is lost and the job seeker is without work, are 
prior earnings and hours sufficient to qualify for benefits?
The crux of this issue is the current use and measurement of 
monetary eligibility for UI using a measure of quarterly or 
annual wages. Such measures have traditionally been used by 
state UI programs to measure labor force attachment. The Advi-
























































































SOURCE: Unpublished Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of Labor.
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Table 7 Employed and Unemployed Full-Time and Part-Time by Age in 
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SOURCE: Employment and Earnings 46(1), January 1999, Table 8.
sory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC 1996) 
addressed this issue for both part-time and low-wage workers. 
States examine earnings and hours in a base period that consists 
of four calendar quarters to see if UI claimants can demonstrate 
labor force attachment. In many states, someone working either 
half-time at the state average covered wage or full-time at the 
state minimum wage would not qualify for UI benefits. The 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC 
1996, p. 20) recommended that "each state should set its law so 
that its base period earnings requirements do not exceed 800 
times the state's minimum hourly wage, and so that its high quar 
ter earnings requirements do not exceed one-quarter of that 
amount." The intent of the ACUC was to improve the likelihood 
that part-time and low-wage workers who work at least 40 per 
cent of the work year would be able to collect UI.
B) If two or more part-time jobs were held and one is lost, is there 
eligibility for UI benefits?
Eligibility is possible in many states, but the answer depends 
on the level of prior income and current income. All states will
Session 1: Charting the Landscape 103
pay a weekly UI benefit to claimants with sufficient prior earn 
ings if current weekly income drops to a low but positive level. 
Most states have a lump sum earnings disregard. There are 11 
states which have both a disregard and a benefit reduction tax 
rate on earnings.
In 1994-1995, a field experiment was conducted in Washington 
state to evaluate whether liberalizing the benefit reduction formula 
would increase work effort. l5 The control group of 208,818 UI benefi 
ciaries from that experiment provides some insight into earnings by 
older workers while in claims status. For the control group, under 
then-existing Washington state law, the earnings disregard was $5 per 
week and benefits were reduced by 75 percent of weekly earnings 
above $5. As shown in Table 8, workers 45 years of age and older 
tended to have more weeks with a UI payment and more weeks with 
reported earnings and a UI payment. Note that this pattern is most 
exaggerated for the oldest group of workers (those 65 years of age and 
over), who also had a significantly lower average weekly benefit 
amount.
C) Will a beneficiary lose UI eligibility for refusing a new job 
because it is full-time rather than part-time?
State UI laws would generally disqualify beneficiaries from 
the receipt of benefits. The beneficiary would lose eligibility for 
refusing suitable work, provided that the available job was in the 
usual occupation and paid a wage close to that paid for recent 
similar work. Thus, the UI program continues to expect that the 
norm for labor force participation is full-time employment and 
that only job seekers for such jobs should continue to receive UI.
D) Will a beneficiary lose UI eligibility for refusing a new job 
because the hours of work would conflict with required hours on 
a currently held part-time job?
State rules would suspend UI benefit eligibility for failing to 
satisfy the availability requirement for job search. Current UI 
eligibility rules are based on the assumption that people leave 
full-time work and seek return to full-time work.
Thus, all part-time workers experience severe difficulty when they 
apply to receive benefits. Even if they succeed in initially receiving
Table 8 Part-Time Earnings and UI Benefits in Washington State, 1994-95
Earnings/benefits
Earnings when on UI 
claim ($)
UI amount received ($)
UI when earning ($)
UI when not earning ($)
% of UI dollars
When earning
When not earning
Weeks with UI receipt
Weeks UI when earning
Weeks UI when not
earning
% of weeks with UI
When earning
When not earning
Weekly benefit amount ($)
Base period earnings ($)
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benefits, they are in danger of loss of benefits if they are not prepared to 
accept a full-time job. Since they participate in part-time work at a 
greater rate than others, older workers are particularly disadvantaged 
from receiving UI by these eligibility rules.
ADEQUACY OF BENEFITS
Unemployment insurance provides temporary partial wage 
replacement to active job-seekers who are involuntarily out of work. 
The level of the weekly benefit amount (WBA) is directly related to the 
prior level of earnings. Having a wage-related benefit reinforces the 
concept that unemployment insurance is an earned right, based on con 
tributions required by law to be paid by the worker's employer as 
"insurance premiums" against the risk of unemployment. The wage- 
related benefit is intended neither to improve a prior low standard of 
living nor to support a sumptuous living standard created by a high 
income. Because UI is a social insurance program with the fundamen 
tal social aim of preventing wide-spread poverty, all states impose UI 
maximum benefit rates to spread benefits as widely as is practical.
The adequacy of the WBA in performing the income maintenance 
function can be gauged by the percentage of lost income which benefits 
replace (i.e., the replacement rate). Since the beginning of the federal- 
state UI program in the United States, there has been general accep 
tance of the idea that the weekly benefit should replace one-half of the 
worker's lost weekly wages (O'Leary and Rubin 1997, pp. 166-169). 
More broadly, adequacy depends on how well UI benefits help to main 
tain usual levels of household expenditure. We will briefly examine 
both of these concepts for older workers. Naturally, the latter considers 
all sources of income while out of work, including dissaving, pensions, 
and other household members. To understand the role of UI in sup 
porting income security of older workers, it is important to clearly 
understand the interaction of pensions and UI. We give special atten 
tion to this topic.
As shown in Table 9, the weekly benefit amount (WBA) for UI 
claimants rises steadily with age up until age 65. While the WBA aver 
aged $202 in 1998 across all age groups, it averaged only $157 for
Table 9 Benefit and Earnings Measures for UI Beneficiaries in the United States by Age Group, 1998
Measure
Weekly benefit amount 
(WBA) ($)





Base period wages (BPW) 
($, 000)
High quarter wages (HQW) 
($, 000)
HQW+BPW (%)
Base period weeks worked 






































































SOURCE: Unpublished Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of Labor.
a Also called the "reservation wage."
b Average weekly wage is computed as base period wages divided by base penod weeks worked.
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workers aged 24 or less and reached $216 for workers aged 55 to 64. 
The average WBA for workers 65 and over was only $174. The 
decline for these oldest workers most likely is related to the fact that 
workers aged 65 and over often move into lower-wage bridge employ 
ment as they near full retirement age (Quinn 1999). As shown in Table 
9, the normal hourly wage for the 65-and-over group is appreciably 
lower than that for the 55-to-64 age cohort. This dip translates into a 
dip in the base period wage rate, since base period weeks worked are 
on a par with those of younger age groups.
A common summary measure of UI benefit adequacy is the wage 
replacement ratio. While this gross average ratio of mean WBA to 
mean weekly earnings is a crude measure of adequacy with well docu 
mented deficiencies, it is a commonly used measure. 16 By this mea 
sure, Table 9 suggests that UI wage replacement tends to decline with 
age until after age 64. Meeting the UI benefit adequacy standard of 
one-half wage replacement may actually mean beneficiaries are receiv 
ing more than half of potential future wages. This is most likely true 
for displaced workers, who gain reemployment at average wages 20 
percent below prior levels and suffer greater wage reductions if they 
are forced to find work in a new industry or occupation. 17 Even if not 
displaced, it may be true for many older workers who voluntarily seek 
bridge employment after job separation later in their careers. Quinn 
(1999) points out that bridge employment is usually for fewer hours if 
in the same occupation and for lower wages if in a different occupation 
than the career job.
The receipt of pension income had no effect on weekly UI benefit 
payments until the advent of federal rules applied for special extended 
benefits that were authorized during the 1961 recession. In response to 
these recessionary rules, the states experimented with alternative treat 
ment of pension income by UI beneficiaries. Merrill Murray (1967) 
investigated the question, "Should pensioners receive unemployment 
compensation?" based on a collection of 12 state studies of practices 
and effects. He argued that there should be no reduction in UI benefits 
because of pension receipt, that UI is social insurance based on prior 
work experience that should be paid with dignity and dispatch to eligi 
ble claimants with no means test applied. Furthermore, he asserted that 
the state studies showed pensioners who were UI beneficiaries were 
not becoming wealthy from "double dipping." He wrote that "the chief
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reason that pensioners work or seek work is economic necessity. Pen 
sions are, in most instances, insufficient to provide even a modest but 
adequate income" (Murray 1967, p. 37).
Nonetheless, 1976 federal UI amendments (Public Law 94-566) 
required a dollar-for-dollar reduction of UI payments against any gov 
ernmental or other pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or any 
other similar periodic payment which is based on the previous work of 
such individual (U.S. Department of Labor 1999, p. 4-19). The rule 
applies only to payments from plans established by the base period or 
UI chargeable employer. States may disregard pension income if 
established by other than a base period employer, except that Social 
Security and Railroad Retirement benefits reduce UI dollar-for-dollar 
regardless of when entitlement was established. Also, states are per 
mitted to reduce UI by less than each dollar of pension income if an 
employee's own contributions helped establish the pension benefit.
Currently among the 53 state UI programs, 38 prorate UI benefit 
reductions for employee contributions to pension plans, and 28 states 
disregard benefits received from pensions established outside of the 
base period. In recent years, states have experienced administrative 
difficulty when pension accumulations in employer-established defined 
contribution plans (401k) are rolled over into individual retirement 
accounts (IRA). Since the IRA may have been previously established 
with direct personal contributions, the state faces a complex problem 
determining the proportion of IRA distributions to disregard. The 
problem is further complicated when it is recognized that 401k type 
funds may include both employer and employee contributions.
To understand the importance of UI in maintaining living standards 
for older workers, consider the percentage of aged household units 
with income from various sources. Table 10 shows that the proportion 
having income from earnings declines with age. For the three age 
groups 55-61, 62-64, and 65 plus, the respective percentages with 
earnings were 80, 63, and 21; conversely for the same three groups, the 
percentages with retirement income were 27, 63 and 93, respectively. 
A uniform 61-63 percent had asset income, and a uniform 6 percent 
had income from public assistance. UI benefits were received by 6 per 
cent of the 55-to-61-year-old group, by 3 percent of those 62-64, and 
by only 1 percent of those 65 or over. Table 11 considers the same 
three age groups and shows that the majority of aggregate income
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Table 10 Percent of Aged Units3 with Money Income from Various 


























































SOURCE: Social Security Administration (1998), Table I.I.
3 An aged unit is either a married couple living together or a nonmarried person.
Table 11 Aggregate Income of Aged Units3 by Source of Income and Age 
in the United States, 1996





























SOURCE: Social Security Administration (1998), Table I.I.
a An aged unit is either a married couple living together or a nonmarried person.
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comes from earnings and retirement benefits, with the latter most 
important for the oldest group. The bulk of remaining income is pro 
vided from assets, less than 1 percent from public assistance and 
approximately 2 percent from other sources, including personal contri 
butions and UI.
Only a small fraction of older citizens receive UI, and in total it 
amounts to a small proportion of their aggregate income. An important 
question regards the role of UI in maintaining living standards for older 
workers who do receive UI: would their economic position be dramati 
cally altered if UI benefits were not provided? These questions were 
exhaustively examined by Daniel Hamermesh. The following are 
some of his main findings which anticipate effects of the 1976 UI 
reforms (Hamermesh 1980, pp. 83-84).
  Unemployment insurance equalizes the distribution of income 
among older workers compared to what it would be in the 
absence of UI benefit payments.
  Dollar-for-dollar reduction of UI for receipt of private or public 
pension income would reduce UI payments by more than 25 per 
cent among workers aged 59-64 and by over 40 percent among 
workers aged 61-66. Because older Americans generally have 
lower incomes, this increases the income gap between older 
workers and others.
  Within the population of households headed by older workers, 
instituting the pension offset will increase income equality. This 
is because the majority of those receiving both pension and UI 
benefits are in the upper deciles of the income distribution for the 
older population. These households also have a greater ability to 
maintain consumption during periods of unemployment.
  Among older UI recipients, about half have access to past savings 
or borrowing in sufficient amounts such that the pension offset 
would not cause hardship. Families without the capacity to bor 
row when the head is unemployed cut back mostly on consump 
tion of luxury goods.
  The availability of UI benefits neither induces older workers to 
remain in the labor force, nor does it facilitate quicker exit from 
the labor force. However, UI functions as an income transfer to 
workers who have made the decision to retire.
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The social insurance aspect of UI explains the presence of maxi 
mum and minimum weekly benefit amounts (WBAs). 18 States impose 
maximum WBAs because the aim is to prevent widespread descent into 
poverty, not to perfectly smooth consumption for high wage earn 
ers. 19 The minimum WBA is probably of more concern to older work 
ers, many of whom are involved in part-time and low-wage work. 
WBA minimums are set in part to relieve the administrative burden of 
processing weekly payments smaller than some reasonable amount, but 
the minimum WBA often replaces more than half of lost wages 
because of the social adequacy requirement to provide at least a modi 
cum of cash income.20 If UI system changes meant to broaden recipi 
ency by low-wage and part-time workers are considered, investigation 
of minimum WBA policy is needed.
DURATION OF BENEFITS
In the absence of severe economic conditions which trigger benefit 
payments of extended duration, the maximum entitled duration of UI 
benefits is 26 weeks in all but two states. 21 Based on the Benefits 
Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data, the average duration of benefits 
across all age groups is 15.9 weeks, with the average duration increas 
ing steadily with age (Table 12). 22 Benefit durations for workers 24 
years of age or less averaged 14.7 weeks; the average duration 
increased with each age group and reached 16.7 weeks for workers 65 
years of age or older.23
In recent years, some countries experiencing severe labor surplus 
conditions have added a feature to unemployment compensation which 
is targeted to older workers and is intended to provide income pay 
ments as a bridge to private and/or public pension income receipt. In 
1976, the Netherlands began paying benefits through age 65 to persons 
exhausting regular entitlement at age 60 or over; in 1981, the U.K. 
extended the duration and increased the benefit rate for long-term 
recipients aged 60 and over; in the mid 1980s, Germany increased the 
maximum duration of benefits from 12 to 32 months for those aged 54 
and over (Blackwell, Okba, and Casey 1995, p. 84). Such early retire-
Table 12 Outcomes Observed for UI beneficiaries in the Benefits Accuracy Measurement Audit Data
Outcome
Weekly benefit amount ($)
Duration of benefits (weeks)3
Entitlement based on earnings in more than 
one state6 (%)
Outcomes during the key week:
Earnings reported ($)
Benefit reduced because of earnings ($)
Other income reported ($)


















































SOURCE: Unpublished Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of Labor.
a The duration of benefits is measured from the Benefit Year Beginning (B YB) date to the key week. The key week is the week in which a
payment was sampled for the BAM data. 
b Called a combined wage claim.
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ment uses of unemployment compensation also became a popular tool 
for supporting the transition to a competitive labor market in the for 
merly planned economies of eastern and central Europe. For example, 
in Hungary, where full public pension payments may begin at age 60 
for men and 55 for women, early retirement unemployment compensa 
tion payments were offered at even younger ages beginning in 1991.24 
Within the past 15 years, additional countries have relaxed work search 
rules for older workers, thereby permitting longer benefit durations.25
Given the tight labor market conditions in the United States at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, it is unlikely that UI program fea 
tures intended to remove workers from the labor force will be consid 
ered in the near future. The pattern of full- and part-time work by older 
UI beneficiaries suggests a desire for prolonged labor force attachment 
and greater flexibility in choosing employment and income sources. In 
addition to recognizing the importance of work transitions between 
career and bridge jobs and from bridge jobs to full retirement, switches 
between bridge jobs should be accommodated. Flexibility in UI bene 
fit duration, wage replacement, initial entitlement, and continuing enti 
tlement are all elements in shaping a decision context to encourage 
continued labor market involvement by older workers.
WORK INCENTIVES
In providing partial wage replacement, the UI system has the 
potential of prolonging spells of unemployment. Several economists 
following Feldstein (1974) have reported evidence suggesting that UI 
lengthens jobless spells beyond what would occur in the absence of UI 
compensation. Decker (1997) summarizes estimates of how the enti 
tled duration of benefits and the rate of wage replacement affect the 
length of joblessness. 26 None of the previous research has reported 
how these effects of UI vary by age.
Two opposite solutions have been tried to solve this principal-agent 
work-incentive problem. Traditional policy has been to monitor work 
search, while positive reemployment incentives were evaluated through 
field experiments in the 1980s.
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To ensure continuing labor force attachment by beneficiaries and to 
guard against avoidable joblessness, work search requirements have 
been part of continuing eligibility rules since the inception of UI. In 
terms of carrot-and-stick incentives, work search rules represent the 
stick. The stringency and enforcement of such rules has varied greatly 
across the states, and the majority of benefit overpayment errors have 
been traced to improper application of work search rules.27
Work search rules of varying stringency were evaluated in a field 
experiment conducted in Tacoma, Washington, in 1986-1987. Johnson 
and Klepinger (1991, 1994) found that eliminating the work test would 
greatly lengthen the duration of UI benefit receipt. They also found 
that requiring attendance at a job search workshop four weeks after the 
claim and an in-person eligibility review interview halfway through the 
entitled duration of benefits would measurably reduce UI benefit 
receipt. A subgroup analysis of impacts by age found that those under 
25 and those 55 and over behaved similarly to each other and some 
what differently from other age groups. Both groups increased UI 
receipt by the most of all age groups when the work search test was 
relaxed (about 3.3 weeks more for both groups), and both reduced UI 
receipt by the least of all age groups when the work test was strength 
ened (about -0.4 weeks for both groups). The work test appears to be 
particularly effective in changing the work search behavior of older 
workers.
In the 1980s, inadequate forward financing of UI benefits, com 
bined with political efforts to restrain tax increases, led to the explora 
tion of new means for dealing with work disincentive problems while 
retaining the income maintenance function of UI. A variety of new ini 
tiatives were tested as field experiments, with the UI reemployment 
bonus gaining considerable attention.
Decker and O'Leary (1992, 1995) examined the effect of offering 
cash bonus payments to UI beneficiaries who return to work quickly in 
Pennsylvania and Washington. Across the two experiments, the aver 
age bonus offer of about 4 weeks of benefits for return to work within 
about 10 weeks shortened UI benefit receipt by just under half a week.
A subgroup analysis by age for the Pennsylvania experiment sug 
gested that the bonus impact decreased with age and had virtually no 
impact on those over age 55; the Washington results suggested a gener 
ally opposite pattern, with older beneficiaries responding more
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strongly. 28 However, in Washington, workers aged over 45 had an 
appreciably smaller response to the biggest bonus offer, which had the 
largest overall effects. In a pooled analysis of Pennsylvania and Wash 
ington data, bonus impacts were virtually identical across the three age 
groups: under 35, 35 to 54, and 55 plus.29 Age is neither a legal nor an 
effective characteristic on which to target reemployment bonus offers; 
however, recent research suggests that bonus offers targeted to those 
most likely to exhaust benefits may be more cost-effective.30
FINANCING BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL 
NEW LEGISLATION
UI is social insurance; it is neither private insurance nor social wel 
fare. 31 Social insurance embodies incentive aspects found in private 
insurance contracts and eligibility and benefit features required by con 
siderations of social adequacy. Key features which distinguish UI as 
insurance are related to the financing provisions. UI benefits are 
financed by employers through experience-rated payroll taxes. 32 
Experience rating means that employer UI tax rates increase with their 
experience in laying off workers who subsequently draw UI benefits. 33
When the federal-state UI system was established by the Social 
Security Act of 1935, the experience rating of employer UI taxes 
greatly helped make the program acceptable to employers. It was rea 
soned that allocating benefit costs to businesses responsible for unem 
ployment benefit claims would make UI consistent with the free 
market system. The costs of the goods and services produced by 
insured workers would thus reflect the costs of any UI benefits paid to 
them.
Experience rating results in employer involvement in initial eligi 
bility determination and reduces the risk of moral hazard. The United 
States is the only nation in the world which finances unemployment 
compensation benefits with experience-rated taxes. 34 It is the main 
cause of business-labor involvement in the system, but experience rat 
ing ensures that UI will not become a dole on a par with social assis 
tance. No stigma attaches to the receipt of UI, "which provides
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compensation for wage loss as a matter of right with dignity and dis 
patch."35
Limitations of state UI tax systems mean that benefits are not 
always completely charged back to prior employers. Tannenwald and 
O'Leary (1997) identified a number of factors which interrupt the oper 
ation of perfect experience rating: maximum and minimum tax rates, 
limits on the taxable payroll, time lags, and exclusions. 36 Among the 
exclusions are state contributions to extended benefits, benefits paid to 
former employees of bankrupt firms, and dependents allowances. Ben 
efit payments which are not charged back to prior employers are said to 
be socialized. They are paid for by tax features that are usually not 
experience-rated, but instead are collected as a fixed percentage of the 
taxable payrolls at UI covered employers.
For 65 years, the experience-rated UI tax system has operated to 
finance hundreds of billions of dollars in UI benefits. Except for occa 
sional and temporary loans to the states, the basic system has operated 
independent of general tax revenues. The federal/state UI system cur 
rently holds in excess of $50 billion in the Unemployment Trust Fund 
(UTF) and has annual revenues and benefit payments of about $20 bil 
lion (U.S. Department of Labor 1999). Since the Unified Budget Act 
(UBA) of 1969, money held in the UTF is accounted for in the annual 
budget of the United States government (West and Hildebrand 1997, p. 
575). From the time of UBA enactment through 1997, the federal gov 
ernment experienced annual budget deficits; in these years, the UTF 
surplus was hoarded to improve federal unified budget reports. The 
current federal government budget surplus and projections for future 
surplus budgets have raised policy interest in expanded uses of UTF 
money.
A particular policy concern of the Clinton administration has been 
the decline in the ratio of the insured to the total unemployment rate 
(IUR/TUR), that is, the decline in the recipiency ratio. This decline 
threatens both the aggregate adequacy of income replacement and the 
built-in stabilizer function of the UI benefit system for the macro-econ 
omy.
We have recognized that displaced older workers have difficulty 
gaining reemployment at wages which match their career jobs and that 
voluntary transition from career jobs is often done gradually by a shift 
to part-time work on the career job, or to a bridge job which usually
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pays substantially less per hour of work. Late in life, workers make 
transitions from career jobs to bridge jobs, between bridge jobs, some 
times back to career jobs, and eventually to full retirement with income 
from pensions and assets. What improvements in the federal/state UI 
system would best facilitate these transitions, and what would be their 
financing implications?
Changes in UI eligibility rules to accommodate workers in low- 
wage labor markets and workers with preferences for part-time work 
could be financed within the current experience rating framework. 37 
As recommended by the ACUC (1996), permitting initial eligibility for 
those working at least 800 hours in the base period, regardless of base 
period wages, would benefit the low-wage group. Changing continu 
ing eligibility requirements concerning the refusal of suitable work to 
include not only customary wage and occupation, but also customary 
hours per week, is a practical solution. These expansions would 
impose UI tax cost increases on employers in low-wage industries such 
as retail and hospitality, who customarily pay UI taxes at the minimum 
rate. However, such increases would be shared in part by employees 
through moderation in wage increases, and UI tax subsidies flowing 
from these industries to high-wage, high-layoff industries such as con 
struction and manufacturing would diminish.
Some other Ul-related policy accommodations to older workers, 
which may be tempting given federal budget surplus projections and 
the aim of broadening UI recipiency, would most certainly be financed 
from socialized rather than experience-rated taxes. Dependents' allow 
ances are financed by socialized taxes because they stretch the social 
insurance standard, which sets a weekly maximum on partial income 
replacement because of the aim to prevent a desent into poverty. While 
not relevant to older workers, in the spring of 1999, President Clinton 
announced his desire to use the UI system to provide "Birth and Adop 
tion Unemployment Compensation." Such a program would most cer 
tainly be financed by socialized UI taxes. 38 A similar financing scheme 
would be most natural for extensions of UI more relevant to older 
workers, such as paying health insurance premiums for the unem 
ployed or providing early retirement unemployment compensation 
payments to support transition to pension income.39
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INTERACTION WITH OTHER 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS
While discussing the adequacy of UI for older workers, we 
described the interaction between UI and Social Security retirement 
payments: federal law requires that UI benefits be reduced by one dol 
lar for each dollar of Social Security benefits received. In this section 
of the chapter, we examine UI interactions with other employment pro 
grams which may be of relevance for older workers.
The strongest linkage between UI and Employment Service (ES) 
programs is provided through the work test for continuing UI eligibil 
ity. Many state UI laws require registration with and active use of ES 
services to maintain established UI benefit entitlement. For a variety of 
reasons, including the fact that UI payment errors have often been due 
to improper application of statutory work search rules, many states 
have relaxed their work test.40 These changes have weakened the link 
between UI and ES.
The UI-ES linkage was renewed and strengthened in 1993 by fed 
eral legislation creating the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Ser 
vices (WPRS) system. The legislation required states to establish 
procedures for early identification of UI beneficiaries most likely to 
exhaust their UI benefit entitlement and to refer these persons quickly 
to special reemployment services. State UI and ES agencies were 
identified as key partners in the WPRS, and Job Training Partnership 
Act (JTPA) service delivery agencies were encouraged to cooperate 
and provide reemployment services, particularly for their Economic 
Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA) Act clients.
Most states choose to implement the WPRS system using a statisti 
cal profiling model. The U.S. Department of Labor developed a proto 
type statistical model and provided training to the states in how to 
adapt principles of the prototype for their own uses. To examine the 
model's sensitivity, the preliminary prototype prepared by the U.S. 
Department of Labor included an age variable to help predict the likeli 
hood of UI benefit exhaustion. This variable and certain others, how 
ever, are prohibited by federal civil rights legislation and were 
excluded from the final model recommended by the Department of 
Labor. Nonetheless, an analysis was conducted to determine the
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impact of dropping the prohibited variables. In the case of age, it was 
found that even though age was a significant variable, the effect of the 
age variable was largely accounted for by the variable for tenure on the 
prior job, which was adopted in the final model (Wandner 1998).
Table 13 presents predicted and actual UI benefit exhaustion rates 
by age group, computed on a sample of beneficiaries drawn in Michi 
gan before the WPRS was implemented. This sample was used to esti 
mate the Michigan WPRS profiling model (Eberts and O'Leary 1996). 
Because of the civil rights prohibition, age was not included in the logit 
models estimated to predict UI benefit exhaustion in Michigan. The 
table shows that the actual UI exhaustion rate for beneficiaries aged 65 
and over is appreciably higher than for other age groups and that the 
Michigan model predicts a modestly higher exhaustion rate for that 
group. However, the actual exhaustion rate for all the age groups less 
than 65 is nearly uniform, ranging between 21 and 25 percent. The 
Michigan profiling model was estimated using nonlinear methods and 
predicts the likelihood of exhaustion to increase exponentially with 
age. This pattern was most likely captured by the tenure variable. The 
model indirectly identifies those permanently separated from their 
employer and industry, because they are likely to be long-term UI ben 
eficiaries. Research by Chan and Stevens (1999) and others suggests 
that unemployed older workers have a greater risk of prolonged jobless 
spells. Data are not available on the age distribution of those referred 
to WPRS job search workshops, but it is likely to include older workers 
in high proportion to their numbers in UI benefit receipt. It should be 
mentioned that both program staff and participants have responded 
very positively to the special services given those profiled and referred 
by the WPRS system (Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer 1999).
In addition to the WPRS system, several other global changes are 
now altering the way that UI interacts with other employment pro 
grams and the way that clients interact with UI. The local administra 
tion of UI is rapidly changing from conducting in-person interviews to 
taking claims by telephone. The new telephone systems are being used 
for the filing of both new initial claims and continuing claims. Less 
and less do unemployed workers wait in line at a UI claims center. 
Unless older workers are either called in to attend a job search work 
shop because of the WPRS or called to attend an eligibility review 
interview to go over their job search efforts and plans, they may never
Table 13 Predicted and Actual UI Benefit Exhaustion Rates by Age in Michigan, 1994
Measure
Predicted UI exhaustion rate


























SOURCE' For the control group used to develop the Michigan Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services model 
(Eberts and O'Leary 1996)
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enter a physical location for UI services. By 1998, half or more of con 
tinued claims in 35 states were taken by telephone (24 states took 
more than three-quarters of these claims by telephone). Furthermore, 
11 states took about half or more of their initial claims by telephone.41 
This move to telephone claims is now accelerating.
Sweeping change in the public reemployment services landscape is 
coming soon because of requirements of the Workforce Investment Act 
(WIA) of 1998. This law requires that public one-stop career centers 
be established in local areas to deliver a coordinated package of reem 
ployment services including UI, ES, skill retraining, and referral to 
other employment programs. While UI is a required partner at one- 
stop career centers, the trend toward telephone claims suggests that it 
may be present simply as a telephone on the wall over which UI claims 
can be made.
By July 2000, when WIA becomes operational nationally, an older 
worker reaching a one-stop career center in most areas will find a dif 
ferent mix of training and employment services than has been offered 
under JTPA. Under WIA, there is a more structured approach to the 
provision of services. It is expected that all individuals entering a one- 
stop career center will first be offered core services that will consist of 
self-service and modest staff-assisted services. Only if these core ser 
vices do not suffice will the individual be offered intensive services 
which will involve greater staff assistance. Skill training will be 
offered only after other avenues to employment have been exhausted. 
It is expected that training will be provided to a smaller proportion of 
clients than under JTPA.
Under JTPA, most of the services received by older workers were 
from two special programs, the Senior Community Service Employ 
ment Program and Services for Older Workers (JTPA Title II, Section 
204(D)). Older workers usually did not participate in regular JTPA 
programs for disadvantaged adults. Older workers were greatly under 
represented in their receipt of service under the program for disadvan 
taged adults (Title IIA). Workers 45 years of age and over amounted 
to about 45 percent of the eligible population in program year 1995, 
but those 45 and over received only 13 percent of services. Notably, 
those aged 55 and over received only 2 percent. For the dislocated 
worker program (Title III), workers 45 years of age and over were pro-
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portionally represented, being about one-third of both the eligible and 
service receiving populations (Poulos and Nightengale 1997).
The aim of new one-stop career centers under the Workforce 
Investment Act (WIA) is to attempt to serve all workers who seek 
assistance. No single group is targeted for services under WIA; 
instead, a wide variety of services can be accessed by all workers.
Under the JTPA program, services for older workers were specified 
under Section 204(D), and section 202(c)(l)(D) required that 5 percent 
of the federal allocation to states had to be used for these older worker 
services. No similar provision exists under the WIA to differentiate 
older workers from other adults. On the other hand, in the establish 
ment of the one-stop delivery system under WIA, there are a number of 
required partners and programs. Some activities provided by the Older 
Americans Act of 1965 are part of the required partnerships.42 The 
result is that older workers will have certain activities available under 
WIA, but these activities will not have special funding. Older workers 
will be treated differently, but they will be subject to the same funding 
constraints and have the same availability of services as any other adult 
worker when entering a one-stop career center.43
There is a separate employment program funded by the federal 
government for older workers. The Senior Community Service Pro 
gram provides part-time employment, at least 20 hours per week, in 
community service activities for older workers. This program is 
funded by an annual federal appropriation. Strong congressional sup 
port has resulted in a stable funding level for this program in recent 
years. Congress appropriated $440.2 million for the program in the 
1998 and 1999 fiscal year budgets and has appropriated the same 
amount for the year 2000, which will be the first year of full operation 
under WIA.
TOPICS FOR FUTURE POLICY ANALYSIS 
AND RESEARCH
In studying economic security for older workers, considerable 
attention should be given to unemployment insurance (UI) as a source 
of income security and as a potential influence on work incentives.
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Current policy reviews, such as the one by the Committee for Eco 
nomic Development (1999), which have explored how the private sec 
tor can make better use of older workers in the labor force, consider the 
impact of governmental policy with respect to Social Security and 
Medicare on older workers, but they do not address the important role 
ofUI.
Previous policy analysis and research which does examine UI and 
older workers has tended to be based on an earlier and more simplistic 
model. It was a model of a single transition near the end of the work 
ing life: a one-step move from full-time work in a career job to full 
retirement. That model is rapidly being replaced by one involving a 
chain of employment transitions: from career job to bridge job, 
between bridge jobs, perhaps back from a bridge job to a career job, 
and finally a gradual movement into full retirement.
New research should address how UI influences the choice and 
timing of the wide variety of labor market transitions which happen in 
the second half of the working life. Many older workers are already 
electing to work rather than retire and to remain in their current com 
munities rather than to move to retirement communities. This trend is 
likely to continue strongly in the future. In particular, the role of part- 
time work and self-employment are likely to be very important in the 
future. A recent survey sponsored by the American Association of 
Retired Persons (AARP) found that four-fifths of all workers born 
between 1946 and 1964, the "baby boomers," intend to continue work 
ing after retirement: 58 percent in part-time employment; 5 percent in 
full-time employment "doing something different"; and 17 percent in 
self-employment (Roper Starch 1999).
Demographic patterns in United States labor markets at the start of 
the twenty-first century suggest that it would be wise to investigate and 
develop policies to encourage the continued labor market participation 
of older workers. Employer groups are increasingly concerned about 
maintaining labor market participation of older workers, given the 
smaller cohorts that will follow. They want the supply of skilled labor 
that older workers embody available for productive use. The new study 
by the Committee on Economic Development (1999), entitled "New 
Opportunities for Older Workers," is really about what employers and, 
to a lesser extent, government can do to retain and hire older workers. 
This study seems to focus more on the basic decision to work or not,
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rather than the ongoing decisions that older workers continually need 
to make about what type of employment to pursue and what to do if a 
given job ends. More attention needs to be paid to the impact of UI as 
a source of income and as an influence on work incentives for older 
workers.
Changes in UI rules concerning initial eligibility, continuing eligi 
bility, wage replacement, and partial benefits should all be examined to 
evaluate effects on the likely employment patterns of older workers. 
Particular attention should be given to UI features affecting the choice 
of self-employment, part-time work, seasonal work, and agricultural 
jobs.
The financing consequences of possible UI program changes 
should also be estimated, as should the macroeconomic impact of 
broadening recipiency. UI program features that would promote flexi 
ble and extended labor force participation by older workers should also 
enrich the employment choice environment for other workers. There 
fore, it-would be useful to examine the impact of such program changes 
on UI as a built in stabilizer of aggregate expenditure.
The UI program has an impact on whether workers choose to work 
or to enjoy leisure. The potential impact of policy change in the areas 
outlined would probably have a greater impact on the behavior of older 
workers than on that of younger workers, who are strongly attached to 
the labor force. As our society tries to retain older workers in the labor 
force, we need to look closely at the current and potential role of UI.
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1. Burtless (1999) summarizes retirement trends and the economic research focusing 
on retirement incentives.
2. Methods for collection and use of the Benefits Accuracy Measurement (BAM) 
data is given in U.S. Department of Labor (1996). BAM samples are drawn 
weekly in the 50 states, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. Procedures are 
designed to ensure that each sample is representative of paid claims in the state 
that week.
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3. Policy definitions are given in the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment 
Assistance (EDWAA) Act of 1988. These definitions largely earned over to the 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998. An overview of research applications 
of this concept are given in Leigh (1990).
4. Hippie's (1999a) data is from the Displaced Worker survey, which is conducted 
every two years by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to provide information on the 
number and characteristics of persons who have been displaced from their jobs 
over the past three years. Based on a supplement to the February 1998 Current 
Population Survey, the latest study is for the period 1995-1996. It reveals that 
between 1995 and 1996, 2.2 million workers aged 20 years or older lost jobs they 
had held for three or more years due to the plant or company closing or moving; 
positions or shifts being abolished; or the employer not having enough work for 
them to do. The data show that during the 1990s there was a steady decline in the 
displacement rate of long-term workers from 3.9 percent in 1991-1992, to 3 3 
percent in 1993-1994, to 2.9 percent in 1995-1996.
5. The BAM data are used to assess the accuracy of UI benefit payments by selecting 
key weeks of benefit payments. Beneficiaries who have long durations of UI ben 
efit receipt have a higher probability of being selected for the weekly BAM sam 
ples.
6. The problem of moral hazard is present when the insured can affect the chance of 
experiencing the unfavorable outcome insured against, without being observed by 
the insurer. In unemployment insurance, moral hazard is present if a worker can 
affect the chance of being unemployed while not being detected by the state 
unemployment agency. The state agency will disqualify UI beneficiaries when a 
job separation or continuing joblessness is determined to be avoidable.
7. For older workers, an appealing feature of Feldstein and Altaian's (1998) proposal 
is that borrowing from the government takes place when accounts are exhausted, 
and "negative account balances are forgiven at retirement age."
8. A temporary UI self-employment program was established in 1993 as part of the 
North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA). Federal legislation in 1998 perma 
nently gave states the option to provide self-employment assistance with UI trust 
fund money.
9. The 11 states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Minne 
sota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Among 
these, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Rhode Island have not yet implemented their 
programs.
10. Wandner (1992) provided an overview of the international experience. He also
summarized the two U.S. experiments which predated the NAFTA authorizing
legislation. 
11 About the experiments, see Benus, Wood, and Grover (1994); about the programs,
see Vroman( 1999). 
12. In many states there is also a requirement that a certain number of hours must
have been worked in the reference period called the base year.
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13. Following a 1994 decision by the U S. Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit 
case of Pennington versus Didnckson, many states have implemented alternate 
benefit year (ABY) rules which consider income and hours in the four most recent 
calendar quarters if eligibility is not established using the standard rule. The 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC 1996, p. 19) 
endorsed general adoption of ABY rules.
14. Anderson (1997) examined state rules and practices in administering continuing 
UI eligibility.
15. O'Leary (1997) found that liberalizing the benefit reduction formula increased 
earnings reported to the employment security department but did not increase 
work effort.
16. O'Leary (1998, pp. 66-71) discussed the deficiencies of such aggregate average 
measures.
17. See the estimates of Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993).
18. A thorough discussion of these matters is provided by O'Leary and Rubin (1997, 
pp. 194-199).
19. The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC 1996) recom 
mended a federal standard requiring the maximum weekly benefit amount to 
equal two-thirds of the statewide average weekly wage, so as to allow a majonty 
of covered workers to receive at least 50 percent wage replacement.
20 A 1962 Department of Labor recommendation urged that the minimum "be 
related to the weekly wages of the lowest wage group in the state for which the 
unemployment insurance program is considered appropriate" (U.S. Department of 
Labor 1962).
21. Both Massachusetts and Washington offer regular benefit durations as long as 30 
weeks Woodbury and Rubin (1997) provided an exhaustive review and critique 
of UI extended benefit programs.
22. The Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data measures the duration of bene 
fits from the beginning date of a worker's benefit year the date at which they 
established their eligibility for benefits until the date when that worker's claim 
was investigated (the key week).
23 These duration estimates underestimate claimant duration because the data is cen 
sored. The claimant's benefit history is measured up until the BAM key week is 
selected but not after.
24 In Hungary, the unemployment compensation financing system partially subsi 
dized early retirement payments for surplus workers in struggling enterprises and 
fully paid such benefits when the enterprise was bankrupt (O'Leary 1995, p. 732).
25. Australia in 1987, Belgium in 1985, and New Zealand in 1992 either eliminated 
or greatly relaxed the work search requirement for older unemployment compen 
sation beneficiaries (Blackwell, Okba, and Casey 1995, p. 85)
26. Lengthening the entitled duration of benefits by one week is estimated to lengthen 
joblessness by between 0.1 and 0.5 weeks, while a 10 percent increase in the wage 
replacement rate is estimated to increase the joblessness by between 0.3 and 1.5 
weeks.
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27. Burgess and Kingston (1987, p. 235) cited "difficulty in monitoring claimant 
compliance with weekly eligibility criteria" as a prime cause for UI payment 
errors associated with the work test
28. Impact analyses by age for the Pennsylvania experiment are reported by Corson et 
al. (1992, p. Ill), while those for Washington are reported by Spiegelman, 
O'Leary, and Kline (1992, p. 127).
29. Decker and O'Leary (1992, p. 54) reported impact estimates by age group for a 
pooled Pennsylvania and Washington sample while controlling for the interaction 
of age with other factors.
30. Recent research suggests that when a low bonus amount with a long benefit dura 
tion is targeted to those most likely to exhaust benefits (displaced workers), it 
appears to be cost-effective (O'Leary, Decker, and Wandner 1998).
31. These arguments are developed more completely by Blaustem, O'Leary, and 
Wandner (1997, pp. 11-17).
32. Employees make small direct contributions in Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsyl 
vania, but it has been estimated by Anderson and Meyer (1995) that employer UI 
taxes are partly paid by workers who contribute to the system through accepting 
lower wages.
33. Principles of experience rating UI taxes are explained in Tannenwald and O'Leary 
(1997). Estimates of the degree of experience rating among states are provided by 
Tannenwald, O'Leary, and Huang (1999).
34. The Netherlands and Poland have considered adopting experience rating of unem 
ployment compensation taxes. Countries outside of the United States often levy 
employer and employee contributions with rates set on a socialized basis to cover 
recent benefit payments Unemployment compensation payments often are subsi 
dized by central government general revenues; occasionally this is the only source 
of financing.
35. Blaustem (1993), p. 47, from a statement of UI objectives issued by the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, in 1955.
36. For example, when an employer's UI tax rate is at the maximum of the range, 
additional UI benefit charges do not change the tax rate on wages. Tannenwald 
and O'Leary (1997) explained that, in such circumstances, subsidies flow from 
other employers.
37. These and related issues are discussed in a broader context by O'Leary and Wand 
ner (1997, pp. 714-716). Other policies to increase UI recipiency, such as broad 
ening coverage to seasonal workers and employees of small farms, are to a lesser 
degree important to older workers, but could also be financed within the experi 
ence rating framework.
38. The proposed rule for Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation allows 
states to determine whether the benefits would be experience-rated or socialized 
(Federal Register 64, no. 232, pp. 67971-67979). Pear (1999) described the polit 
ical dispute over President Clinton's plan to pay cash benefits to those on parental 
leave from the unemployment trust fund.
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39. In 1995, President Clinton "mentioned finding some way to help workers who 
lose their jobs keep their health insurance while they look for work. Under fed 
eral law they can continue their policy for a year and a half by paying 102 percent 
of the combined employer-employee premium, but many cannot afford to do so. 
Clinton favors some form of subsidy to help them" (Rich 1995). On December 
17, 1999, the Ticket to Work and Work Incentive Improvement Act (Public Law 
106-170) was enacted; it allows the extension of Medicare for those on Social 
Security Disability Insurance and Medicaid for those on Social Security Income 
after recipients earnings rise above a given level.
40. Burgess and Kingston (1987) identify the work test as a main source of UI over 
payments, citing the complexity of the ES-UI monitoring as part of the problem.
41. Based on state UI Benefits Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for 1998.
42. WIA section 121(b)(l)(B)(vi).
43. A training and technical assistance guide has been developed for providing spe 
cial services for older workers under the Workforce Investment Act.
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